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Three points are important to understand the concept of feelings as I 
use it in this book: first, feelings are understood as a kind of personal 
and embodied meaning which lingers between the conscious, the pre-
conscious and the unconscious, and between inner and outer objects. 
As such, they are central to human creativity and agency. Second, feel-
ings stem from our relationships with others, and from how this rela-
tional experience is processed by the subject who comes into being and 
is continuously reshaped by these relational processes. Thus, feelings 
have a temporal dimension connected to the historical and social con-
text of the relational experience, as well as to the subject’s life course 
in time and space. Feelings live in socialised subjectivities. Third, this 
means that feelings, even though they are always personal, may also 
display social patterns characteristic of a certain class, gender or genera-
tion. These points also apply when feelings are expressions of gendered 
experiences.
In order to elaborate upon and combine these three points, in this 
chapter I will connect theoretical perspectives from and inspired by the 
German Frankfurt School with some of the more recent psychosocial 
work, which, drawing on object-relational approaches,1 aims at combining 
psychoanalytic theory with societal context and change. What characterises 
both the older ‘grand’ theories from the Frankfurt School and the younger, 
more detailed psychosocial approaches is the effort to find ways to think in 
non-reductive ways about the connections between the outer and the inner 
world, between structure and meaning, and between object and subject. 
However, there are differences in their main questions and preoccupations, 
and also in the ways in which they proceed analytically. The old approach 
of the Frankfurt School seems to have a better grasp on the wholeness of the 
intertwinement of culture, individual and society, providing a framework 
to think about the social patterns of feelings, but not elaborating to any 
great extent upon the psychological processes in individuals. Conversely, 
the younger approach often focuses more on what goes on in the inner 
world of singular persons (and definitely with a more explicit emphasis on 
gender than the old approach), but sometimes with less attention to how 
psychosocial interchanges may also amount to more general social patterns 
of feelings. Where the old approach is occupied with social patterns, the 
younger approach concentrates on the multiple individual variations on 
and tracks to such patterns. I think we need both approaches to grasp feel-
ings as an element in social organisation and change.
 Feelings as Socially Patterned
The understanding of feelings as the emotional aspect of meaning 
makes the approach in this book different from the turn to affect that 
has occurred in a broad range of fields within the humanities and social 
1 The main characteristics of object-relational approaches are that they work with a broader concept 
of human motivation than drive theories tend to do, asserting that attachment and recognition by 
one’s loved ones is as primary a human force as the sexual drive. There are many versions of object-
relation theory, not least in relation to how much the social and historical dimensions are drawn 
into the analysis of the inner psychological object world. Melanie Klein, the founding figure of 
British object-relational theory, works only on the level of the inner, unconscious world, whereas 
more contemporary feminist psychoanalysts as Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin and Lynne 
Layton, whose work I rely on in this chapter, place emphasis on how social relations affect the inner 
psychic processes. It is the latter version I draw on in this chapter, whether I name it ‘object- 
relational theories’ or the psychosocial approach of ‘relational feminist psychoanalysts’.
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 sciences as a response to the discursive dominance in poststructuralism 
(see Leys (2011) and Wetherell (2012) for critical reviews). In many the-
oretical versions of this turn, affect is seen as the opposite of meaning, as 
a ‘formless, unstructured, non-signifying force or “intensity” separated 
from cognition’: Leys 2011: 442). Contrary to this, I see feelings as an 
aspect of meaning and as part of the human capacity to understand and 
act in the world: feelings are enmeshed in stories, biographies and history 
(Chodorow 1999). This does not imply that feelings have to be verbalised 
in order to be felt and present in what is said and done. From psychoana-
lytic theory, I draw the basic assumption that feelings can be conscious, 
preconscious and unconscious, and that they work in ways that may be 
more or less known to the person who harbours these feelings. Feelings 
can be meanings that are existential rather than representational, ‘a form 
of deep memory’ (Bollas 1987: 50), but they may also be symbolised in 
words. Sometimes we reflect on and verbalise what we feel; at other times 
feelings just play an unacknowledged part—conflictual or not—in how 
we perceive the world, making themselves present in the ways we talk 
and act. I understand feelings as personalised meanings floating through 
inner and outer relations and through time. It is something the subject 
carries with him or her, but is also something that is continuously rein-
terpreted and reconstructed as he or she experiences and acts in the world 
together with others in shared contexts.
The idea that feelings are socially patterned is not new. Erik H. Erikson 
has already been mentioned as one psychoanalyst who wrote about the 
ways in which culture, history and ethnicity emerge in unconscious fanta-
sies, symptoms and conflicts (Chodorow 1999: 227). A more sociological 
approach to this is found in the efforts of the Frankfurt School to integrate 
psychoanalysis and Marxism by studying the connection between social 
and economic structures, cultural patterns and individual psychological 
development. The main concern here is not the individual psychological 
story, but the social form of subjectivity and agency in a given historical 
context. One of the terms for this was Erich Fromm’s concept of social 
character, the emotional attitude common to people in a specific social 
class or society in a given historical period. Erich Fromm defined a social 
character as the psychological reactions typical for a social group, which 
have developed as a result of common experiences and life conditions for 
2 Feelings of Gender 25
that group. The emotional matrix of cultural ideas is seen as rooted in the 
character structure of individuals, and this is key to understanding the 
spirit of a given culture, according to Fromm. What is seen as ‘normal’ in 
a society has an emotional foundation in the typical social character of this 
society. It is the similarities in individual responses of most of the mem-
bers, not the differences between these responses that the concept frames. 
The differences are important if we want to understand the single indi-
vidual fully, Fromm says; however, ‘if we want to understand how human 
energy is channelled and operates as a productive force in a given social 
order, then the social character deserves our main interest’ (Fromm 1941: 
278). He engages with the cultural patterns in the subjects’ psychological 
organisation not only as irrational adaption based on repression, but also 
as something that may work as a social and generative force, a dynamic 
psychological adaption of human needs to a particular mode of existence 
in a given society.2 Thus, the social character has both adaptive and cre-
ative sides—it internalises the external necessities, but in a way that also 
appears as sensible and often emotionally satisfying and motivating for 
the person. Fromm’s ideas about the social character, moulded in specific 
social spaces where the individual ‘by adapting himself to social condi-
tions … develops those traits that make him desire to act as he has to act’ 
(p. 283) can also be linked to Bourdieu’s much later concept of habitus 
and his idea about ‘a socialized libido’ which combines necessity with the 
person’s engagement in the field (Aarseth 2016). However, since Fromm 
understands society as not merely repressive, it may also meet the human 
striving for freedom and growth. In this way the psychological organisa-
tion of the individuals, which develops as a result of the social process, also 
becomes ‘productive forces, moulding the social process’ (p. 13).
A problem with Fromm’s concept of social character is that it works 
on a very general level, combining grand societal formations like 
Protestantism and modern authoritarianism with general traits of psy-
chological reaction and defence, and thus leaves us with a rather mas-
sive image of the character as a fixed internal template that more or less 
2 It is important to be aware that the concept of ‘socialisation’ in this German tradition is not the 
functionalist one from Parsons with which it is often identified in the English-speaking world, but 
a concept that, like the concept of ‘subjectivity’, integrates societal moulding and adaption together 
with the constitution of personal agency.
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stays as it was made, or gets defensive and destructive if the societal for-
mations that produced it change. In this sense, Fromm offers a ‘grand 
theory’ working with jigsaw pieces too big to really understand continu-
ing social transformations. The concept of character is also contested in 
modern psychoanalytic theory to the extent that it is based on assump-
tions about fixed and coherent identities. More process-oriented con-
cepts like ‘identifications’ or ‘subjectivities’, indicating that a person have 
multiple versions of selves in his or her internal world, have gained foot-
hold compared to theories of identity and character as fixed psychologi-
cal structures (Benjamin 1995). Modern psychoanalytic theories would 
agree that developmental processes connected to biographical trajectories 
are formative, but not that such formations of subjective structures are 
unchangeable, coherent and without internal conflicts (Layton 1998). 
Instead of talking either about character and identity as reified entities, 
as in the case of Fromm, or about fluidity with no core or continuity, as 
is the case in postmodern theories, we may talk about historical patterns 
of identification, desire and subjectivity in individuals as well as across 
social groups.
The concept of pattern is central in the work of the British cultural 
critic Raymond Williams, who has expanded on Fromm’s ideas with the 
concept structure of feeling in a way that maintains both the formative 
and the transformative dimensions of subjectivity and cultural practices. 
The structure of feeling is not an overall psychological organisation of the 
subject’s inner world, but patterns in the subject’s feelings:
The term I would suggest to describe it is the structure of feeling: it is as 
firm and definite as the ‘structure’ suggests, yet it operates in the most 
delicate and intangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this structure of 
feeling is the culture of the period, it is the particular living result of all 
elements of the general organisation … I do not mean that the structure 
of feeling, any more than the social character, is possessed in the same 
way by the many individuals in the community. But I think it is a very 
deep and very wide position, in all actual communities, precisely because 
it is on it that communication depends. And what is particularly interest-
ing is that it does not seem to be, in any formal sense, learned. (Williams 
2011: 69)
2 Feelings of Gender 27
Williams describes the structure of feeling as a felt sense of the quality of 
life at a particular time and place, and he connects it to gradual change 
and to generation: ‘We are usually most aware of this when we notice the 
contrast between generations, who never quite talk “the same language”’ 
(2011: 68). Structures of feeling may change over generations, they may 
take on different forms in different segments in society, and there may be 
several structures of feelings in a society at the same time.
In spite of its holistic character, Williams’ concept seems to provide us 
with some smaller jigsaw pieces, explicitly detached from the idea that 
the material structures necessarily ‘come first’. He insists emphatically on 
the interconnectedness of different processes in society: historical pro-
cesses are complex wholes where each part needs to be understood for 
what it is, but it is the interaction, interpretation and feedback between 
them that leads to transformation: ‘A keyword is pattern—it is with that 
any useful cultural analysis begins, and with its relationships to other pat-
terns, which may sometimes reveal unexpected identities and correspon-
dences in hitherto separately considered activities’ (Williams 2011: 67). 
He opposes the idea of separating a concept of ‘reality’ from subject—as 
subjects are in themselves realities and expressions of society, not some-
thing that should be related to a social world outside itself. Thus, human 
experience is both objective and subjective in one inseparable process:
It is right to recognise that we became human individuals in terms of a 
social process, but still individuals are unique, through a particular hered-
ity, expressed in a particular history. And the point about this uniqueness 
is that it is creative as well as created: new forms can flow from this particu-
lar form, and extend in the whole organisation, which is in any case being 
constantly renewed and changed as unique individuals inherit it and con-
tinue it. … In practical terms I think such approaches will be the kind of 
study of patterns and relationships, in a whole process, which we have 
defined as the analysis of culture. There, in the practice of creation, com-
munication and the making of institutions, is the common process of per-
sonal and social growth. (Williams 2011: 125–126)
Williams is primarily writing about art and culture; however, he also 
includes the psychological organisation of the subject in this constant 
renewing of society. The re-creation of meaning is done both by the 
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society as a whole and by every single individual. The idea that changes 
can happen on any level of society is particularly relevant to my argument 
about the generative role of feelings of gender. No structure has priority 
and subtle changes may take place before they are properly understood. 
Williams offers the example of gradual changes in literary style. Such 
small elements of qualitative changes are not necessarily epiphenomena 
to institutional changes or just accidental variation. They are social in 
two ways: they are ‘changes of the present’ and they are effective before 
they are classified and understood (Williams 1977: 132–133). Williams’ 
concept of structure of feeling, his take on incremental changes and how 
they can happen anywhere in a system are highly generative ideas for my 
analysis of how patterns of feelings in different generations, genders and 
classes represent an agency that may contribute in creative ways to the 
gradual change of gendered practices. However, the concept of feelings 
needs more psychological elaboration in order to become operative in a 
study of lived lives.
 Socialisation and Desire
In psychoanalytic theory, on the level of individual psychology, we find 
compatible ideas about the connection between the self and the world in the 
work of the German-American psychoanalyst Hans Loewald. Loewald does 
not start by separating the inner world of the subject from outer reality. On 
the contrary, in the psychological organisation of the subject—ego, reality, 
objects and drives—they are created at the same time, in a process where 
a unitary whole is gradually differentiated by the subject. In this process 
many versions of both ego and reality will be created and, unless fixations 
happen, this will allow for a flexible ego-reality integration where earlier 
versions will remain alive as dynamic resources in later versions (Loewald 
1980: 20). This means that the qualities of inner and outer are not given 
in any direct empirical sense, but are elaborated by the subject in ‘a lifelong 
process in which not only the meaning but also the constitution and orga-
nization of inner and outer are negotiated’ (Chodorow 2003: 903).
It is the work of Hans Loewald and Nancy Chodorow who in 
 particular have informed my understanding of the continuous and 
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 creative  interchange between the conscious and the unconscious. In 
their perspective the unconscious is not entirely equated with dynami-
cally repressed emotions and fantasies, since the unconscious is also seen 
as a creative and generative part of our psychological organisation. This 
makes us co-creators of meaning and reality, not passive victims of the 
world. Neither Loewald nor Chodorow’s vision is to replace unconscious 
life with conscious, but rather to infuse and integrate unconscious life in 
the conscious. It is this infusion and integration that gives conscious life 
its depth, texture and richness. Fantasy and reality come to resonate in 
a way where fantasy deepens and enriches the experience of reality, and 
reality keeps us rooted and connected in the world (Chodorow 1999: 
248). The constant intertwining of the conscious, the preconscious and 
unconscious, of past and present, self and reality, subject and object are 
captured by the concept of transference. In Chodorow’s words, transfer-
ence is the phenomena ‘that we personally endow, animate, and tint, 
emotionally and through fantasy, the cultural, linguistic, interpersonal, 
cognitive, and embodied world we experience’ and, by this process, ‘any 
single thought or feeling simultaneously creates and embeds itself in both 
realities’ (Chodorow 1999: 244, 14). Thus, feelings are always part of 
experienced meanings, of the ways in which the subject makes sense—or 
cannot make sense—of things.
Nancy Chodorow has argued that Hans Loewald together with Erik 
H. Erikson and others can be seen as representatives of a specific American 
‘intersubjective school of ego psychology’, which combines an under-
standing of the ego functions as integrating and synthesising experience 
in a creative way, with a relational perspective that sees the self as devel-
oped through interpersonal relations and by processes of transference 
between subject and object (Chodorow 2004). This ego- psychological 
and object- relational perspective where development is not only seen in 
terms of instinctual drives or universal conditions for subject formation, 
but also in terms of relational attachment and culture, and where the 
unconscious is not only understood as the dynamically repressed, but also 
as a part of the self that organises and may enrich experience and inform 
creativity and agency, has been criticised for severing the critical poten-
tial in Freud’s theory of desire. Psychoanalytic perspectives indebted to 
Lacan reject the notions of ego and reality, and talk instead about a  radical 
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difference between the conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious 
is here seen as a site formed by the prohibition and repressing of desire, 
and it can only express itself in enigmatic and symptomatic ways that are 
not translatable to consciousness. Whereas conscious identity is doomed 
to be expressed through language, social categories and norms, ‘the 
unconscious constantly reveals the “failure” of identity’ (Rose 1986: 90). 
As subjects, split and cast in socially defined identities, we will always lack 
something, and the pressure from unconscious desire will push us towards 
activity, but we do not know what we are looking for and we will never 
find it other than in momentary and partial ways.
A problem in conceiving of consciousness and the unconscious as radi-
cally separated systems of meaning is that it leads into a dualism of con-
formity and non-conformity. The possibility of reflection and agency as 
sources for change is dismissed as it is only unsocialised and unsocialisable 
desire that may represent resistance against the social because it is outside 
the symbolic realm (see also McNay 2004; Layton 2004 and Woodward 
2015 for similar critiques). But as Erikson, Fromm and Williams insist, 
society not only represents pressure and pain for the subject, it also repre-
sents possibilities and pleasure. Conversely, Lynne Layton has argued that 
the unconscious is also infected by the social: it is neither a space free of 
norms nor a space that can solely be conceptualised as resistant to norms 
(Layton 2002, 2004). Her concept of ‘the normative unconscious’ refers 
to the splitting-off of feelings, behaviours and thoughts when they conflict 
with particular social norms connected to gender, class and ethnicity, and 
therefore are deemed unacceptable to those on whom one depends for 
love. Williams also argues that most human actions will combine confor-
mity and non-conformity in a way that does not fit into a model of either/
or of conscious confinement and unconscious protest, and these actions 
must be analysed concretely and over time to decide their character and 
outcome (Williams 2011: 117). Such combinations may represent small 
but desired steps of action, and even when they look rather conformist, 
they may still lead to change in a more long-term perspective. In particu-
lar, the dynamics between generations indicate how a series of actions 
that, seen independently, look only adaptive may in the long run become 
one of the conditions for change. Instead of understanding socialisation 
and desire as opposing forces, we may think in terms of ‘socialised desire’, 
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which places the subject in a generative and creative role that combines 
adaption, defensive reactions and change. Within this framework it is 
possible to understand the conscious, preconscious and unconscious as 
different levels of meaning that can float into each other, without also 
dismissing the existence of unconscious conflict and forbidden desires. By 
seeing self and reality as an original unity that is later differentiated and 
continuously reshaped throughout life, it is possible to see the subject not 
only as either conforming or protesting, but also as continuously in search 
of and as a creator of intermediate solutions in his or her life. In this view, 
the subject is simultaneously socialised, desiring and agential.
The blending of the conscious and the unconscious, of meaning and 
feeling, of conformity and non-conformity, of subject, identity and real-
ity represents a perspective that renders a flexible and useful way to think 
about my data. What I see here is that feelings of gender change over life-
times and between generations, and become part of the specific agency 
we see in each generation. A radical critique of the repressive society or 
an accidental acting-out of unconscious conflicts is seldom what informs 
agency and change of the generations in my study, but is rather a more 
gradual and varied response to the historically framed experience and 
possibilities and new ways of adapting to a given context, whether it is 
done with inattentiveness, hope, ambivalence or pain. This perspective 
makes it possible to describe and understand the strivings of the subject 
in a cultural and historical context instead of analysing it in terms of uni-
versal conflicts between the social order, power regimes and unruly desire.
 Feelings and Relations
In an object-relational perspective, feelings stem from and are shaped 
in and through relations. In particular, but not exclusively, this begins 
in our first relations of love and dependency. Early identifications with 
caretakers, or aspects of them, are the way in which the human sub-
ject and psychic reality first come into being: Melanie Klein stated that 
object-relations are the centre of emotional life. The subject’s feeling of 
its own self and others is differentiated from these early experiences with 
relations through processes of transference, projections and introjective 
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fantasies—feelings of who I am, who I can or cannot be in relationships 
with others:
The child, by internalizing aspect of the parent, also internalizes the par-
ent’s image of the child—an image that is mediated to the child in the 
thousand different ways of being handled, bodily and emotionally … The 
bodily handling of and concern with the child, the manner in which the 
child is fed, touched, cleaned, the way it is looked at, talked to, called by 
name, recognized and re-recognized—all these and many other ways of 
communication with the child, and communicating to him his identity, 
sameness, unity, and individuality, shape and mould him so that he can 
begin to identify himself, to feel and recognize himself as one and as sepa-
rate from others and yet with others. (Loewald 1980: 229–230)
The basic feelings of self and others are prior to mental representations 
and language and will become part of what Christopher Bollas has coined 
the individual’s ‘unthought known’ (Bollas 1987: 280). The unthought 
known is an operational logic of ‘being and relating’: through countless 
intersubjective exchanges with the infant and its object world, ‘sometimes 
in tranquillity, often in intense conflict’, the unthought known comes to 
constitute the subject’s ego-structure. Thus, ‘ego-structure is a trace of a 
relationship’ (Bollas 1987: 51–60). This also means that agency is formed 
and takes shape in relationships (Layton 2004: 47). Layton’s concept of 
the normative unconscious refers to relational conflicts where the child 
split off aspects of itself to maintain love, and where these aspects will 
survive in the unconscious and be seen in behavioural tendencies to split, 
disavow or idealise what the child was refused to be. Thus, splits are pro-
duced by unmourned losses. Self-esteem problems generally reflect dif-
ficulties in negotiating a sense of agency while maintaining connections 
to others (Layton 1998: 17; 2004: 32). However, in contrast to Lacanian 
theories, where processes of splitting and disavowal of the other are seen 
as the universal conditions for subject formation, the relational and tem-
poral perspective inherent in a object-relational understanding includes 
an intersubjective space that opens up the possibility for communication, 
mutual love, recognition, creativity and agency (Layton 1998).
The tension between self and others represents a developmental logic 
where the child learns to navigate between the intrapsychic worlds of 
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object-relations and the interrelational world of real subjects (Winnicott 
1971; Benjamin 1995). Thus, the relational world gradually becomes 
both internally object-relational and interpersonally intersubjective: 
we may become both ‘love objects’ and ‘like subjects’ to each other, as 
Benjamin (1995) coins it. This means that whenever two people interact, 
there are at least two self–other psyches at play. If the inner objects do not 
overwhelm and invade us, we may experience a non-narcissistic interac-
tion based on mutual recognition. The more we are able to see the other 
as a whole and separate subject, the more we can also integrate negative 
feelings we may have towards the inner object. Coming to terms with the 
internal and external parents is a major developmental project and a life-
long internal process for most people (Chodorow 2012: 47). Winnicott 
points out that for the child, it is the intrapsychic aggression towards the 
object that makes it possible to recognise the other as a like subject, as it 
gives the child the possibility to experience that the other continues to 
exist in spite of the child’s aggression. Through this, narcissism or omnip-
otence is broken: there are others out there with a separate centre of exis-
tence and their own agendas. Benjamin states that in this way destruction 
is ‘the Other of recognition’ (1995: 48). The capacity to deal with both 
kinds of relationships is developmentally intertwined and therefore the 
pains of loss and the pleasures of attachment are equally determinant in 
subject formation (Layton 1998: 18–19). It never becomes a harmony, 
but implies continuous disruption and repair.
In the intrapsychic as well as in the interpersonal space, the sense of self 
and others is constructed through transference, which includes the uni-
versal psychic capabilities of the human mind like positive and negative 
identifications (I see myself and the other as alike in some respect—and I 
can like it or not like it), introjections (I see something of the other as part 
of myself ), projections (I place something of myself in the other), affective 
ambivalence (I love and hate the other at the same time), disidentifications 
(this is not me!), splitting (dividing things into only good and only bad 
and projecting the aspects onto others or myself ), disavowal (refusing to 
recognise the reality of a traumatic experience) and idealisation (aggran-
dising and exalting the other and thereby also enlarging myself ).3 These 
3 See Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) for more detailed definitions.
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processes continue to create and re-create our psychic reality throughout 
life. Some of them exist to defend us from anxiety and pain; others, like 
identification and introjection, may also enrich our agency or sense of 
subjectivity. Furthermore, identifications are not a coherent relational sys-
tem—we may identify with aspects of different persons, in negative and 
positive ways at the same time (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 207–209). 
They are ways of taking parts of the other into our selves.
If feelings come from and are reworked through relations, this adds 
a dimension of temporality to the different sociocultural locations. This 
is a point that has been developed especially by Lynne Layton (1998, 
2004), who underscores how relatedness, agency and feelings take shape 
in particular cultural fields framed by class, race and gender. This makes 
some versions of subjectivities acceptable and others not, and generates 
particular patterns of conflicts and defences:
We are born into families with their own histories and ways of mediating 
culture, and so we immediately engage in particular patterns of relating. 
The ways those patterns are internalized is conditioned by the accidents of 
gender, race, and class and by the power differentials that structure them at 
any given moment … It is also conditioned by the bodies and tempera-
ments of individuals and those with whom they come in contact. The 
meanings these bodies, temperaments, and other individual identity ele-
ments take on are not outside of culture; they are culture … Subjects idio-
syncratically make meaning of, identify with, disidentify with, take up 
parts of, or modify these positions in accord with on-going relational expe-
rience. (Layton 1998: 27–28)
An object-relational perspective is intergenerational in itself: it concerns 
change and transmission between generations in the light of changing 
sociocultural contexts which encounter the different generations at dif-
ferent points in their biographies. This means that the feelings that are 
experienced by the subject in any given situation will be historical in two 
ways: in the biographical dimension, where feelings from earlier points in 
life will be carried with the individual into new situations and continu-
ously reworked; and the contextual dimension, where a specific historical 
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and political context will frame the reworking of conscious and uncon-
scious feelings in the individual.
 Gender and Feelings
Feelings of gender are also products of intrapsychic and intersubjective 
relations. From an object-relational perspective, gender involves both 
sexual object choices and the emergence of a gendered self, which again 
has multiple constitutive components that may vary from individual to 
individual and also over time. Gender is a ‘soft assembly’, as Adrienne 
Harris has called it, constructed, assembled and maintained differently in 
different persons (Harris 2008: 40). Chodorow (2012) suggests four com-
ponents that are often central: the psychic creation of bodily experience, 
the experience of intrapsychic and intersubjective self–other relations, the 
transference of linguistic and cultural categories, and the affective tonali-
ties explicitly connected to gendered fantasy content. These components 
will come together in each individual’s personal animation of gender, 
‘with a characteristic emotional tonality and an organization designed to 
manage and contain particular anxieties and defenses’ (Chodorow 2012: 
146). Relational feminist psychoanalytic theories maintain that gender 
is a cultural as well as a personal construction (Layton 1998; Chodorow 
1999). It is seen simultaneously as an effect of discursive positions and as 
elements of each individual’s sense of self and his or her specific relation-
ships with others. The personal images of gender gained through rela-
tional experiences, and the emotional qualities that are invested in them, 
do not necessarily conform to dominant cultural norms. Continuous and 
ongoing identity work is necessary to make the inner and the outer world 
connect (Nielsen 1996, 1999; Chodorow 1999). Every psychological for-
mation of gender is unique, but it is also the case that a shared social and 
historical context may create social patterns in gendered subjectivities—
between or within gender groups—because the society and the kinds of 
families where subjectivities are created are gendered in historical and 
cultural ways (Layton 2004; Roseneil 2007). As Chodorow (2012) for-
mulates it, gender development is characterised by clinical individuality, 
universal psychic processes and social patterning.
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The move towards thinking in terms of processes of identification 
rather than of identity mentioned earlier has been prominent in gender 
theory over the last 25 years. In particular, constructing gender identi-
ties in a binary system with different developmental routes for women 
and men has increasingly been seen as outdated, also in versions where 
they are not understood as universal, but historically contingent stories 
(Chodorow 1978; Nielsen and Rudberg 1989). The focus is not on gen-
der identity as a specific content, but rather on processes of identifica-
tions, which may more often than not traverse biological and cultural 
gender dichotomies. In addition, relational psychoanalyst feminists today 
question the presumption that internally consistent gender identities are 
possible or even desirable. However, the rejection of the binary gender 
identity model has in this strain of thought not led to a dismissal of ideas 
of development or the significance of gender differences in such develop-
mental processes. As Jessica Benjamin (1995) has argued, if the category 
of identification is seen as relevant for theories of gender, it must also be 
taken into account how such gender categories take hold in the psyche. 
The question has rather moved from taking difference as the point of 
departure to seeing how difference is constructed, not only culturally, but 
also personally. In Benjamin’s words, the notion of psychologically ‘com-
ing to terms with [sexual] difference’ has given way to exploring the ways 
in which perceptions of the body and the sense of self and others ‘come to 
figure difference’ (Benjamin 1995: 49). This places the question of gender 
differences in a relational space, which also includes how gender was built 
into the parents’ own psychic worlds:
Any term that a child learns is learned in the context of the parent’s uncon-
scious and her or his own particularized femininity and masculinity, which 
is itself emotionally cast, shaped by fantasy, and includes many elements of 
affective tonality and context that the parent has built into gender. 
(Chodorow 2012: 145)
The generational perspective makes visible that gender also emerges in 
same-sex relations, not only within the gender polarity. For instance, 
a women’s positive or negative experience of her body may be organ-
ised around reproductive issues or sexuality, or both. A man may feel 
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his ‘masculinity’ threatened when confronted with powerful women or 
because he feels inadequate in relation to other men, or both (Corbett 
2009; Chodorow 2012). By locating the formation of sexuality and gen-
der in a relational space, ‘sexual difference’ in fact becomes less absolute 
and more complex than when differences lead back to a single principle 
of binarity, whether based on anatomy (Freud) or commanded by lan-
guage (Lacan). The relational roots imply that even though personal gen-
der identities will always have multiple components and represent some 
kind of psychological compromise formations, they are not always or 
necessarily defensive and pathogenic symptoms of splitting and repudia-
tion of otherness, which is the dominant perspective in poststructuralist 
accounts (Butler 1990; Goldner 1991; Corbett 2009). Gender identities 
may, depending on the way they are culturally constructed and person-
ally formed, be more or less hurtful, and in benign cases they may con-
tain pleasurable elements that people may want to hold on to (Benjamin 
1995; Layton 1998; Harris 2002, 2008).
 Temporality in Theories
Psychoanalytic theory places sexuality and gender among the most impor-
tant dimensions of human development. How this should be understood 
has been the target of heated debates ever since Freud first formulated his 
theory about the Oedipal phase, where the incest taboo installs masculin-
ity and femininity as complementary psychological structures based on 
the identification with the same-sex parent and love of the opposite-sex 
parent. As is well known, this model has been heavily criticised for its 
inherent biologism, universalism, binarity, phallocentrism and hetero-
normativity. Later theories have challenged the Freudian idea that psy-
chological gender differences are non-existent before the Oedipal phase 
and argue that differences in heterosexual masculine and feminine per-
sonalities are better explained by early object-relations and the ways in 
which gender arrangements frame processes of separation-individuation 
for girls and boys (Dinnerstein 1976; Chodorow 1978; Benjamin 1988). 
Newer gender theories have questioned the binary opposition between 
desire and identification and have argued that both fathers and mothers 
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alike may be ‘love objects’ and ‘like subjects’ for the child (Benjamin 
1995; Chodorow 1999). The different models have emerged as theoreti-
cal alternatives in academic debates about psychoanalysis and gender, and 
the latest one is more in tune with recent relational thinking as well as 
with recent gender theory. However, one important point to notice in 
the context of a generational study is that different models of gender 
development have been formulated at different historical points in time. 
To what extent do different theories of psychological gender match dif-
ferent and historically delimited patterns of feelings? May psychological 
theories (and other theories about the social world) be seen and used as 
historical formations, not only in the sense that they reveal the cultural, 
normative and theoretical assumptions of their time, but also as sources 
of information about empirical patterns that later disappeared or became 
less poignant?4 Psychological theories are made not only for internal aca-
demic use, but also as tools to describe clinical situations. Hence, theo-
retical models of gender and heterosexual development can also be seen 
as attempts to describe different figurations of gender that emerged in 
different historical and familial contexts. Such figurations represent what 
in the context of this book I call differently historically shaped ‘structures 
of feeling’ connected to gender. Maybe gender identities were, in fact, 
more binary and less fluid if we go back half a century? Is it the theoreti-
cal idea of stable identities that is wrong or have such identities simply 
become less frequent?5 Because the childhoods of the three generations 
in our study took place in the same span of time as when these psycho-
analytical models of gender development were formulated, criticised and 
dismissed, these questions beg to be asked.
I will return to the question of the possible connections between psy-
chology, history and theory in Chap. 9, where I present some of the 
most influential theories of psychoanalysis and gender conceived in the 
historical period of our three generations, and see to what degree they fit 
4 See also Layton (2002) on this experience of how ‘outdated’ theories may fit some patients in the 
clinical setting well.
5 Stable identities are not the same as coherent identities, which no psychoanalytic theory would 
assume. It was Freud who with his concept of the unconscious was the first to argue that the human 
psyche is internally contradictory. Thus, the self will always be in discord with itself in more or less 
painful ways.
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the changes and continuities in psychological gender that emerge from 
our study. In raising these questions I am neither saying that we should 
assume that all theories will always be empirically true during the period 
in which they were conceived, nor that theoretical and normative cri-
tique is redundant or worthless. Rather, I am arguing that it may be 
useful to include historical perspectives in the ongoing theoretical, philo-
sophical and normative debates. The current focus in feminist theory on 
the situatedness of knowledge that emphasises the importance of place, 
space and variation quite often appears to be oblivious to the dimen-
sion of temporality. Without historical framing, critiques of universalism 
and essentialism, for instance, may become universalist and essentialist 
themselves.
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